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Abstract
This paper studies a fundamental mechanism of how to detect a conflict be-
tween arguments given sentiments regarding acceptability of the arguments.
We introduce a concept of the inverse problem of the abstract argumentation
to tackle the problem. Given noisy sets of acceptable arguments, it aims to
find attack relations explaining the sets well in terms of acceptability seman-
tics. It is the inverse of the direct problem corresponding to the traditional
problem of the abstract argumentation that focuses on finding sets of accept-
able arguments in terms of the semantics given an attack relation between
the arguments. We give a probabilistic model handling both of the problems
in a way that is faithful to the acceptability semantics. From a theoretical
point of view, we show that a solution to both the direct and inverse problems
is a special case of the probabilistic inference on the model. We discuss that
the model provides a natural extension of the semantics to cope with uncer-
tain attack relations distributed probabilistically. From en empirical point of
view, we argue that it reasonably predicts individuals sentiments regarding
acceptability of arguments. This paper contributes to lay the foundation for
making acceptability semantics data-driven and to provide a way to tackle
the knowledge acquisition bottleneck.
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1. Introduction
The world is full of difficult problems. Argumentation is a human cog-
nitive process to understand them. The driving force of argumentation is a
conflict of opinions. The ability to detect conflicts is essential for humans to
engage in argumentation. The way humans recognize conflicts between argu-
ments is based on a simple principle of mutual exclusivity or incompatibility
regarding acceptability of arguments. Let us take a look at an example to
illustrate the principle.
Example 1. A professor and a government official argue about a govern-
ment’s policy on the allocation of a research budget.
Professor: The government should widely and fairly allocate research funds
for research diversity.
Official: Our government should select and concentrate on promising re-
search in terms of cost effectiveness.
At this point, no explicit conflict is stated in these arguments. The existence
of a conflict thus depends on the context of the arguments and knowledge of
the arguers or listeners.
Suppose that a rational agent judges these arguments not to be acceptable
at the same time no matter how the agent considers acceptability of the
individual arguments. This incompatible acceptability of the arguments must
lead to agent’s opinion that there is a conflict between the arguments.
The important insight we can obtain from this example is that agent’s senti-
ment on the acceptability of the individual arguments is the cause of agent’s
recognition of a conflict between the arguments. The goal of this paper is
to give a scientific account of a detection of a conflict relation between argu-
ments based on the mutual exclusivity of acceptability of arguments.
There are at least two computational methodologies to detect a conflict
relation between arguments. The first methodology is based on natural lan-
guage processing or computational linguistics. Given textual discourse, the
goal involves identifying individual arguments, their internal structures and
their interactions [1, 2]. Argumentation mining [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12],
recognizing textual entailment [6, 13, 14] and natural language inference
[15, 16] all belong to the first methodology. The first methodology is re-
garded successful if a conflict relation obtained with the approach conforms
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to a human judgement. The second methodology is based on the acceptabil-
ity semantics [17] that emerged from the study of non-monotonic reasoning
[18, 19]. Given acceptability of arguments, the goal involves identifying an
attack relation explaining the acceptability well in terms of the acceptability
semantics. It is interesting to investigate whether a conflict relation obtained
with the second methodology is successful in the sense of the goal of the
first approach. However, it is not a fundamental requirement of the second
methodology. The argumentation framework (AF for short) synthesis prob-
lem [20] based on realizability [21], the abstract structure learning [22], and
enforcement [23] and the generative models of the abstract argumentation
[24, 25] all belong to the second methodology.
The second methodology is much less studied compared with the first
one in spite of its importance. Indeed, if it is faithful to the acceptability
semantics then its solution is normative in the sense that a rational agent
ought to accept the solution. This is because the acceptability semantics
itself is a normative theory of human cognition regarding acceptability of
arguments.1 It tells us which arguments a rational agent ought to believe
when the agent accepts a given attack relation. A faithful methodology thus
discusses which attack relation the agent ought to believe when the agent
accepts an observation on acceptability of arguments. However, it is more
difficult than it seems, to predict an attack relation in a way that is faithful
to the acceptability semantics. The acceptability of arguments we observe
in practice is one’s sentiment regarding agreement or disagreement on the
arguments. It often involves uncertainty due to a variety of reasons such as
lack of data, the presence of noise in observation, and the existence of multiple
solutions. A probability theory thus is useful to deal with the uncertainty in
a certain way.
However, what is still not clear is how to give a probabilistic account of
an uncertain solution in a way that is faithful to the acceptability semantics.
In this paper, we use probability theory to give a formal representation of
problem-independent uncertain argumentation-theoretic inference. It is very
different from another interesting research direction using probability the-
ory to give a formal representation of problem-dependent uncertain domain
1If it is a descriptive theory telling us what one actually or psychologically believes
then it should be studied in psychology, rather than logic, requiring an empirical approach
for its correctness. It is meanwhile a descriptive theory of many non-monotonic logics,
e.g., Reiter’s default logic, Pollock’s inductive defeasible logics and logic programming.
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knowledge, e.g., [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. From a semantic point of view, we
for the first time distinguish a concept of the inverse problem from a di-
rect problem of the theory of abstract argumentation (or just the abstract
argumentation) [17], as follows.
Direct problem Given an attack relation between arguments, a direct
problem aims to find sentiments regarding acceptability of the argu-
ments defined in accordance with the acceptability semantics.
Inverse problem Given noisy sentiments regarding acceptability of argu-
ments, an inverse problem aims to find an attack relation between the
arguments explaining the sentiments well in terms of the acceptability
semantics.
From an inferential point of view, we then give a probabilistic model cap-
turing the acceptability semantics in a probabilistic way. It enhances the
worth of the acceptability semantics with the simple view that an attack
relation does not deterministically exist, but they are probabilistically dis-
tributed. We argue that probabilistic inference on the model deals with a
solution concept that is more comprehensive than solutions to both of the
direct and inverse problems. Indeed, we show that a deterministic (i.e., non-
probabilistic) solution to an inverse problem is a special case of our Bayesian
solution. In contrast to the deterministic solution, the Bayesian solution al-
lows us to take into account a subjective beliefs on the existence of attack
relations and to handle uncertainty to what extent each attack relation is
likely to be the case. We also show that a deterministic solution to a direct
problem is a special case of our Bayesian solution. In contrast to the deter-
ministic solution, the Bayesian solution allows us to handle the uncertainty
to what extent acceptability of arguments is likely to be true and to deal with
the situation where acceptability of arguments is caused by multiple attack
relations distributed probabilistically.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. First, to our
best knowledge, this is the first paper introducing a concept of the inverse
problem to the field of computational argumentation. The past two decades
in the field of computational argumentation in AI (artificial intelligence)
witnessed an intensive study on defining acceptable arguments given various
kinds of argumentation frameworks, e.g., [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,
41]. This paper places them on the direct problem and turns the spotlight
onto the inverse direction. Second, this paper lays a foundation for making
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acceptability semantics data-driven. From the data-driven point of view, a
weakness of the study of the abstract argumentation, and a symbolic AI in
general, is a knowledge acquisition bottleneck that is a problem on how to
acquire knowledge from data. In contrast to the direct problem, the input of
the inverse problem is an unstructured data and thus available on the web,
e.g., votes in various social networking services. It makes us easier to find a
killer AI application of acceptability semantics.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the inverse
problem of the abstract argumentation as a counterpart of the direct problem.
In Section 3, we give a probabilistic model to provide a Bayesian solution
to both types of the problems. Sections 4 and 5 discuss correctness of the
probabilistic model in both theoretical and empirical manners. Section 6
concludes with discussion.
2. Abstract Argumentation Problems
2.1. Direct Problems
An abstract argumentation framework (AF) [17] is a pair 〈arg, att〉, where
arg denotes a set of arguments and att denotes a binary relation on arg. att
represents an attack relation between arguments, i.e., (a, b) ∈ att means “a
attacks b.” Suppose a ∈ arg and S ⊆ arg. S attacks a if, and only if
(iff), some member of S attacks a. S is conflict-free iff S attacks none of its
members. a is acceptable with respect to S iff S attacks all arguments that
attack a. A characteristic function F : Pow(arg) → Pow(arg) is defined
as F (S) = {a|a is acceptable with respect to S} where Pow(arg) is the
power set of arg. S is admissible iff S is conflict-free and every member of
S is acceptable with respect to S. The acceptability semantics [17] defines
four types of extensions of AF that intuitively represent sets of acceptable
arguments.
• A preferred extension is a maximal (with respect to set inclusion) ad-
missible set.
• A conflict-free set S of arguments is a stable extension iff S attacks
each argument which does not belong to S.
• The grounded extension is the least fixed point of F .
• An admissible set S of arguments is a complete extension iff each ar-
gument, which is acceptable with respect to S, belongs to S.
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Let ε, arg and att represent an acceptability semantics, a set of argu-
ments, an attack relation on arg, respectively, and acc represent the set of
extensions of the argumentation framework, 〈arg, att〉, with respect to ε.
When we see ε as a function, the following equation holds.
ε(arg, att) = acc (1)
Equation (1) thus shows the relationship among a knowledge representation,
i.e., 〈arg, att〉, a consequence, i.e., acc, and a semantics, i.e., ε. We assume
that arg and ε are arbitrary but fixed. We define a direct (or forward)
problem of the abstract argumentation, as follows.
Definition 1 (Direct problem). A direct problem of the abstract argu-
mentation is defined as follows: Given an attack relation att, find an accept-
ability acc satisfying acc = ε(arg, att).
2.2. Inverse Problems
Next, we consider an inverse of the direct problem. In contrast to the
direct problem assuming the existence of an attack relation, an inverse prob-
lem aims to determine an attack relation. It is natural to assume that some
of an attack relation, denoted by attk, is known. The following equation thus
holds from Equation (1).
acc = ε(arg, attk, att) (2)
We again suppose that arg and ε, and attk as well, are arbitrary but fixed.
We define an inverse problem of the abstract argumentation, as follows.2
Definition 2 (Inverse problem). An inverse problem of the abstract ar-
gumentation is defined as follows: Given an acceptability acc, find an attack
relation att satisfying acc = ε(arg, attk, att).
A problem, either inverse or direct, is said to be well-posed if a solution ex-
ists, the solution is unique if it exists, and the solution depends continuously
on the input, i.e., solution existence, solution uniqueness and solution stabil-
ity, respectively [42]. Neither an inverse nor direct problem of the abstract
2It is possible to think of another inverse problem where a semantics is also unknown,
for instance. This paper, however, does not discuss it because it is not very practical but
rather complicated.
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argumentation is well-posed, i.e., ill-posed. Indeed, the solution stability
does not hold because they are a discrete problem rather than a continuous
problem. The solution existence holds in a direct problem when semantics
is not stable. However, it holds in neither direct nor inverse problems in
general.
Example 2. Let arg = {a, b} and attk = ∅. Given acc = {∅, {a, b}}, there
is no attack relation that is a solution to the inverse problem.
An acceptability is observed in an inverse problem. The solution existence
does not generally hold in an inverse problem because it is empirically true
that an observation often includes some amount of noise. Noise can be an
effect irrelevant to semantics ε, or can be a false or inaccurate observation. A
realistic inverse problem thus needs to find an attack relation att satisfying
the following equation:
acc = ε(arg, attk, att) + η, (3)
where η and + denote a noise and a notional operator for addition, respec-
tively. The presence of noise makes an inverse problem difficult because it
requires a solution to distinguish the true acceptability from a noise insepa-
rably observed.
The solution uniqueness holds in a direct problem. It however does not
hold in an inverse problem.
Example 3. Let arg = {a, b, c} and attk = ∅. Given acc = {{a, c}}, the
attack relations represented with the directed graphs below are all solutions
to the inverse problem.
There is a restriction on an attack relation and semantics that guarantees
the solution uniqueness.
Proposition 1 (Solution uniqueness). An inverse problem satisfies the
solution uniqueness if both known and unknown attack relations are symmet-
ric and irreflexive, and semantics is either complete, preferred or stable.
The restriction of Proposition 1 is not a very practical nature. In practice,
an observation consists of sentiments regarding acceptability of arguments,
7
collected from a lot of individuals. Such sentiments would be explained well in
terms of complete semantics because they are likely to include both credulous
and skeptical sentiments. Moreover, self-attacking arguments rarely occur
in practice and it is more useful to find the existence of attack between
arguments rather than the direction of the attack.
When a problem is ill-posed, it does not mean that the problem is in-
appropriate at all. It implies that its solution is inherently uncertain and
it is effective to use a probability theory to formulate the uncertainty in a
certain way. Moreover, there is another reason why a probabilistic approach
is preferable. Almost all of the real arguments are an enthymeme, i.e., an
argument whose premise or conclusion is unexpressed. The existence of an
attack relation between enthymemes depends on the contexts of argumen-
tation and knowledge of the arguers and listeners. Let us take a look at a
simple example of the uncertainty of the existence of an attack relation.
Example 4. Suppose one hundred individuals asked to express their opin-
ions whether there is an attack between the following arguments a and b.
• a: Tweety can fly because it is a bird.
• b: Tweety is a penguin.
Many individuals would find an attack between them because they know
that penguins cannot fly. However, not all individuals would find the attack
because some individuals do not know that penguins cannot fly or some other
individuals might know that Tweety is a genetically-altered flying penguin.
Now, let us assume that ninety individuals think that there is an attack
between them and the remaining ten individuals think that there is no attack.
The best we can conclude is that the probability that there is an attack
between them is 0.9.
The uncertainty of the existence of an attack relation leads to the idea that ac-
ceptability of arguments depends on multiple different attack relations prob-
abilistically distributed. An inverse problem in this situation wants to find
N attack relations attn (1 ≤ n ≤ N) satisfying the following equation.
acc = ε(arg, attk, att1) + · · ·+ ε(arg, attk, attN) + η (4)
Meanwhile, the direct problem in this situation wants to find acc given all
attn (1 ≤ n ≤ N). Here, it is natural to think that different attn have
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different influences on acc. A probabilistic approach makes it easier to deal
with the situation because it gives a formal account of the idea that an attack
relation is probabilistically distributed. It is theoretically a general case of
the view that an attack relation deterministically exists. We will discuss
comprehensive solutions to both the inverse and direct problems later in
Equation (6) and Equation (7), respectively.
3. Abstract Argumentation Model
This section gives a Bayesian account of direct and inverse problems of
the abstract argumentation. It allows us to probabilistically deal with all of
the situations, from (1) to (4), discussed in the previous section.
3.1. Probabilistic Model for Abstract Argumentation Problems
Let arg be a set of arguments. We assume two kinds of random variables.
For all m ∈ arg × arg, Attm is a random variable representing the existence
of an attack relation from its left to right elements of m, and attm represents
a value of Attm, either 0 or 1.
3 For all d ⊆ arg, Accd is a random variable
representing acceptability of d, and accd represent a value of Accd. Att
and att are assumed to denote sequences of Attm and attm, respectively.
Similarly, Acc and acc denote sequences of Accd and accd, respectively.
Thus att and acc represent an attack relation on arg and acceptability of
arg, respectively. In this paper, we study the relationship between Att and
Acc. We thus assume that arg and acceptability semantics are arbitrary but
fixed.
It is natural to assume that there are two cases, either a attacks b or
a does not attack b, i.e., Att(a,b) = 1 or Att(a,b) = 0, given a pair (a, b) of
arguments a and b. It is moreover natural to assume that if the probability
that a attacks b is λ(a,b) then the probability that a does not attack b is
1 − λ(a,b). We thus define the probability distribution of an attack-relation
variable as follows.
Definition 3 (Attack distribution). Let Attm be a random variable of an
attack relation and λm be a constant such that 0 ≤ λm ≤ 1. The probability
3For the sake of simplicity, m also represents a set of two arguments. Attm in this case
represents the existence of a symmetric attack relation between the arguments in m.
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distribution over Attm, denoted by p(Attm), is given by
p(Attm) = λ
Attm
m (1− λm)1−Attm .
It is obvious that p(Attm) = λm if Attm = 1 and p(Attm) = 1 − λm if
Attm = 0. An actual value of λm is assumed to be given in advance by a
subjective belief. Technically speaking, the distribution is called a Bernoulli
distribution [43] often used to represent a discrete probability distribution
that takes two values, 0 or 1.
It is natural to assume that there are two cases, either a set d of arguments
is acceptable or not, denoted by Accd = 1 or Accd = 0, respectively. In
terms of the acceptability semantics [17], Accd depends on att, i.e., an attack
relation on arg. Let us assume a constant θd|att (0 ≤ θd|att ≤ 1) representing
the probability that the acceptability semantics makes d acceptable given
att. The probability distribution over Accd given att can be defined using
a Bernoulli distribution with parameter θd|att.
Definition 4 (Acceptability distribution). Let Accd be an acceptability
variable, att be a sequence of values of attack-relation variables and θd|att be
a constant satisfying 0 ≤ θd|att ≤ 1. The probability distribution over Accd
given att, denoted by p(Accd|att), is given by
p(Accd|att) = θAccdd|att(1− θd|att)1−Accd .
θd|att should take a high value when att explains the acceptability of d
well in terms of the acceptability semantics. It thus holds when there is an
extension e of the abstract argumentation framework of att such that there
is a large agreement between e and d. The agreement can be defined in terms
of the following two aspects: a true positive and a true negative, denoted by
tp and tn, respectively.
tp(e, d) = {a ∈ arg|a ∈ e, a ∈ d}
tn(e, d) = {a ∈ arg|a /∈ e, a /∈ d}
It is thus reasonable to assume that θd|att depends on the cardinality of the
union of the true positive and the true negative, i.e., |tp(e, d)| + |tn(e, d)|.
We give three definitions of the acceptability parameter. The first one is a
deterministic acceptability parameter.
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Definition 5 (Deterministic acceptability parameter). The deter-
ministic acceptability parameter θd|att is given by
θd|att =
{
1 d ∈ ε(arg,att)
0 otherwise.
Therefore, θd|att = 1 holds if and only if there is an extension e of the
argumentation framework of att such that |tp(e, d)|+ |tn(e, d)| = |arg| holds.
The second parameter is a linear acceptability parameter defined using a
linear function g(x) = wx+a. Since g is a monotonically increasing function,
it is reasonable to define the acceptability parameters with the output of g
given |tp(e, d)| + |tn(e, d)|, i.e., g(|tp(e, d)| + |tn(e, d)|). We thus normalize
g so that its domain and range become [0, |arg|] and [0, 1], respectively. We
then obtain
f(x) =
g(x)−min{g(x)}
max{g(x)} −min{g(x)} =
wx+ a− a
w|arg|+ a− a =
x
|arg| .
We define θd|att as f(|tp(e, d)|+ |tn(e, d)|) where |tp(e, d)|+ |tn(e, d)| is max-
imum with respect to an extension e of the argumentation framework of att.
Definition 6 (Linear acceptability parameter). The linear acceptabil-
ity parameter θd|att is given by
θd|att =
1
|arg| max
{
|tp(d, e)|+ |tn(d, e)|
∣∣∣ e ∈ ε(arg,att)} .
θd|att thus increases 1/|arg| when another argument becomes a member of
the true positive or true negative.
The third parameter is an exponential acceptability parameter defined
using an exponential function g(x) = a(w)x. Since g is a monotonically
increasing function given w ≥ 1 and a ≥ 0, it is similarly reasonable to define
the acceptability parameters with g(|tp(e, d)|+ |tn(e, d)|). We thus normalize
g so that its domain and range become [0, |arg|] and [0, 1], respectively. We
then obtain
f(x) =
g(x)−min{g(x)}
max{g(x)} −min{g(x)} =
a(w)x − a(w)0
a(w)|arg| − a(w)0 =
wx − 1
w|arg| − 1 . (5)
We similarly define θd|att as f(|tp(e, d)|+ |tn(e, d)|) where |tp(e, d)|+ |tn(e, d)|
is maximum with respect to an extension e of the argumentation framework
of att.
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Definition 7 (Exponential acceptability parameter). Let w > 1. The
exponential acceptability parameter θd|att is given by
θd|att =
1
w|arg| − 1 max
{
w|tp(d,e)|+|tn(d,e)| − 1
∣∣∣ e ∈ ε(arg,att)} .
Given a large value w, θd|att approximates w|tp(d,e)|+|tn(d,e)|/w|arg|. In this case,
θd|att increases w times when another argument becomes a member of the
true positive or true negative.
The exponential acceptability parameter has good properties. First, the
deterministic acceptability parameter is a special case of the exponential
acceptability parameter.
Proposition 2. Let θd|att be an exponential acceptability parameter and
φd|att be a deterministic acceptability parameter. limw→∞ θd|att = φd|att holds.
Second, the linear acceptability parameter is also a special case of the
exponential acceptability parameter.
Proposition 3. Let θd|att be an exponential acceptability parameter and
φd|att be a linear acceptability parameter. limw→1 θd|att = φd|att holds.
Figure 1 shows each type of the acceptability parameter. It is visually
shown that both of the deterministic and linear acceptability parameters are
extreme cases of the exponential acceptability parameter.
Example 5. Table 1 shows all possible linear and exponential acceptability
parameters given arg = {a, b, c} and att = (att{a,b}, att{a,c}, att{b,c}). It is
observed that the exponential acceptability parameters give a relatively sharp
distribution compared with the linear acceptability parameters.
For the sake of generality, we assume the exponential acceptability parameter
unless otherwise stated. All of the acceptability parameters are faithful to
acceptability semantics in the sense that no heuristic is introduced in their
definitions. The exponential acceptability parameter is indeed just a normal-
ization of an exponential function and the linear acceptability parameter is
also just a normalization of a linear function.
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of dependencies of the random
variables and deterministic parameters we introduced in this section. The
boxes, so-called plates, represent that there are M nodes of Attm and λm
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Figure 1: Acceptability parameters versus the cardinality of the true positive and
true negative, given one hundred arguments.
for each pair m of arguments, D nodes of Accd for each set d of arguments,
and L × D nodes of θd|l for each pair of d and a possible attack relation
att labelled l. We call the components of the Bayesian network an abstract
argumentation model and represent it with M.
Theoretically speaking, it is a mixture model in the sense that the parent
distribution for Attm influences the child distribution of Accd. It is however
different from a custom, e.g., mixtures of Bernoulli distributions or Gaus-
sian distributions [44]. They assume that each value of a child variable can
be generated from a different value of a parent variable. By contract, the
abstract argumentation model assumes that every acceptability is generated
from the same attack relations. This comes from our basic assumption that
an attack relation is statistically an objective opinion although acceptability
of arguments is a subjective opinion determined by an extension subjectively
chosen by individuals.
3.2. Probabilistic Inference of Attack Relations
Abstract argumentation modelM is a generative model in the sense that
it gives a formal account of the argumentation-theoretic causality, how ac-
ceptability of a set of arguments is interpreted given an argumentation frame-
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Table 1: Linear acceptability parameters (upper) and exponential acceptability
parameters (lower) defined with complete semantics. θX is an abbreviation for
θX|att where att = (att{a,b}, att{a,c}, att{b,c}).
att θ∅ θ{a} θ{b} θ{c} θ{a,b} θ{a,c} θ{b,c} θ{a,b,c}
(0, 0, 0) 0 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 1
(1, 0, 0) 2/3 2/3 2/3 1 1/3 1 1 2/3
(0, 1, 0) 2/3 2/3 1 2/3 1 1/3 1 2/3
(1, 1, 0) 1 1 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 1 2/3
(0, 0, 1) 2/3 1 2/3 2/3 1 1 1/3 2/3
(1, 0, 1) 1 2/3 1 2/3 2/3 1 2/3 2/3
(0, 1, 1) 1 2/3 2/3 1 1 2/3 2/3 2/3
(1, 1, 1) 1 1 1 1 2/3 2/3 2/3 1/3
(0, 0, 0) 0 w−1
w3−1
w−1
w3−1
w−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1 1
(1, 0, 0) w
2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1 1
w−1
w3−1 1 1
w2−1
w3−1
(0, 1, 0) w
2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1 1
w2−1
w3−1 1
w−1
w3−1 1
w2−1
w3−1
(1, 1, 0) 1 1 w
2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1 1
w2−1
w3−1
(0, 0, 1) w
2−1
w3−1 1
w2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1 1 1
w−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1
(1, 0, 1) 1 w
2−1
w3−1 1
w2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1 1
w2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1
(0, 1, 1) 1 w
2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1 1 1
w2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1
(1, 1, 1) 1 1 1 1 w
2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1
w2−1
w3−1
w−1
w3−1
work in accordance with acceptability semantics. In an inverse problem, we
use the model to trace the causality back to the argumentation framework
from acceptability. Technically speaking, this is achieved by calculating the
posterior distribution over attack relations given values of acceptability vari-
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of the abstract argumentation model.
ables, i.e., p(Att|acc). Using Bayes’ theorem, we obtain
p(Att|acc) = p(acc|Att)p(Att)
p(acc)
∝ p(acc|Att)p(Att)
=
D∏
d
p(accd|Att)
M∏
m
p(Attm)
=
D∏
d
θaccdd|Att(1− θd|Att)1−accd
M∏
m
λAttmm (1− λm)1−Attm (6)
where x ∝ y means “x is proportional to y” and thus there is a constant
K such that x = Ky holds. In M, each acceptability is independently
distributed from the same distributions over attack relations. This property
is said to be independent and identically distributed, i.e., i.i.d.. It results
in the desirable property that enables to successively update the posterior
distributions over attack relations whenever an acceptability is observed. In
fact, it is obvious from Expression (6) that we have the following equation
when observing acc, values of acceptability variables.
p(Att|acc) ∝ p(Att)
D∏
d
p(accd|Att)
When another acceptability accD+1 is observed, the above equation leads to
the result
p(Att|acc, accD+1) ∝ p(Att)
D+1∏
d
p(accd|Att)
= p(Att)p(accD+1|Att)
D∏
d
p(accd|Att)
∝ p(Att|acc)p(accD+1|Att).
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Therefore, the most recent posterior distribution is proportional to the prod-
uct of the previous posterior distribution and the likelihood of the new ob-
servation.
Example 6. We here see how the probability distribution over attack rela-
tions is updated one by one. Let us assume set arg = {a, b, c} of arguments
and three random variables Att{a,b}, Att{a,c}, Att{b,c} of an attack relation.
Now, suppose the observation that set {a} is acceptable, i.e., Acc{a} = 1. The
posterior distribution over attack-relation variables given the observation is
represented by
p(Att{a,b}, Att{a,c}, Att{b,c}|Acc{a} = 1)
∝ p(Acc{a} = 1|Att{a,b}, Att{a,c}, Att{b,c})p(Att{a,b})p(Att{a,c})p(Att{b,c})
= θ{a}|Att{a,b},Att{a,c},Att{b,c}
∏
m∈{{a,b},{a,c},{b,c}}
λAttmm (1− λm)1−Attm .
Let acc be (Acc{a} = 1) and θd|att be the exponential acceptability prior
shown in Table 1 defined with complete semantics. We here suppose w = 2.
The posterior distribution is given as follows.
p(0, 0, 0|acc) ∝ (1/7)(1− λ{a,b})(1− λ{a,c})(1− λ{b,c})
p(1, 0, 0|acc) ∝ (3/7)λ{a,b}(1− λ{a,c})(1− λ{b,c})
p(0, 1, 0|acc) ∝ (3/7)(1− λ{a,b})λ{a,c}(1− λ{b,c})
p(1, 1, 0|acc) ∝ λ{a,b}λ{a,c}(1− λ{b,c})
p(0, 0, 1|acc) ∝ (1− λ{a,b})(1− λ{a,c})λ{b,c}
p(1, 0, 1|acc) ∝ (3/7)λ{a,b}(1− λ{a,c})λ{b,c}
p(0, 1, 1|acc) ∝ (3/7)(1− λ{a,b})λ{a,c}λ{b,c}
p(1, 1, 1|acc) ∝ λ{a,b}λ{a,c}λ{b,c}
Next, we suppose another observation that set {b} is acceptable, i.e., Acc{b} =
1. The posterior distribution is updated as follows in accordance with the
update equation.
p(Att{a,b}, Att{a,c}, Att{b,c}|Acc{a} = 1, Acc{b} = 1)
∝ p(Att{a,b}, Att{a,c}, Att{b,c}|Acc{a} = 1)p(Acc{b} = 1|Att{a,b}, Att{a,c}, Att{b,c})
∝ p(Att{a,b}, Att{a,c}, Att{b,c}|Acc{a} = 1)θ{b}|Att{a,b},Att{a,c},Att{b,c}
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Now, let acc be (Acc{a} = 1, Acc{b} = 1). The posterior distribution is
updated as follows.
p(0, 0, 0|acc) ∝ (1/7)2(1− λ{a,b})(1− λ{a,c})(1− λ{b,c})
p(1, 0, 0|acc) ∝ (3/7)2λ{a,b}(1− λ{a,c})(1− λ{b,c})
p(0, 1, 0|acc) ∝ (3/7)(1− λ{a,b})λ{a,c}(1− λ{b,c})
p(1, 1, 0|acc) ∝ (3/7)λ{a,b}λ{a,c}(1− λ{b,c})
p(0, 0, 1|acc) ∝ (3/7)(1− λ{a,b})(1− λ{a,c})λ{b,c}
p(1, 0, 1|acc) ∝ (3/7)λ{a,b}(1− λ{a,c})λ{b,c}
p(0, 1, 1|acc) ∝ (3/7)2(1− λ{a,b})λ{a,c}λ{b,c}
p(1, 1, 1|acc) ∝ λ{a,b}λ{a,c}λ{b,c}
We further suppose an additional observation that set {c} is acceptable, i.e.,
Acc{c} = 1. The posterior distribution is updated as follows.
p(Att{a,b}, Att{a,c}, Att{b,c}|Acc{a} = 1, Acc{b} = 1, Acc{c} = 1)
∝ p(Att{a,b}, Att{a,c}, Att{b,c}|Acc{a} = 1, Acc{b} = 1)θ{c}|Att{a,b},Att{a,c},Att{b,c}
Let acc be (Acc{a} = 1, Acc{b} = 1, Acc{c} = 1). The posterior distribution
is updated as follows.
p(0, 0, 0|acc) ∝ (1/7)3(1− λ{a,b})(1− λ{a,c})(1− λ{b,c})
p(1, 0, 0|acc) ∝ (3/7)2λ{a,b}(1− λ{a,c})(1− λ{b,c})
p(0, 1, 0|acc) ∝ (3/7)2(1− λ{a,b})λ{a,c}(1− λ{b,c})
p(1, 1, 0|acc) ∝ (3/7)2λ{a,b}λ{a,c}(1− λ{b,c})
p(0, 0, 1|acc) ∝ (3/7)2(1− λ{a,b})(1− λ{a,c})λ{b,c}
p(1, 0, 1|acc) ∝ (3/7)2λ{a,b}(1− λ{a,c})λ{b,c}
p(0, 1, 1|acc) ∝ (3/7)2(1− λ{a,b})λ{a,c}λ{b,c}
p(1, 1, 1|acc) ∝ λ{a,b}λ{a,c}λ{b,c}
In general, we suppose that Acc{a} = 1, Acc{b} = 1 and Acc{c} = 1 are
repeatedly observed N times in total in this order. Given N observations,
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denoted by acc, the posterior distribution is given as follows.
p(0, 0, 0|acc) ∝ (1/7)N(1− λ{a,b})(1− λ{a,c})(1− λ{b,c})
p(1, 0, 0|acc) ∝ (3/7)N−bN/3cλ{a,b}(1− λ{a,c})(1− λ{b,c})
p(0, 1, 0|acc) ∝ (3/7)N−b(N+1)/3c(1− λ{a,b})λ{a,c}(1− λ{b,c})
p(1, 1, 0|acc) ∝ (3/7)N−b(N+2)/3cλ{a,b}λ{a,c}(1− λ{b,c})
p(0, 0, 1|acc) ∝ (3/7)N−b(N+2)/3c(1− λ{a,b})(1− λ{a,c})λ{b,c}
p(1, 0, 1|acc) ∝ (3/7)N−b(N+1)/3cλ{a,b}(1− λ{a,c})λ{b,c}
p(0, 1, 1|acc) ∝ (3/7)N−bN/3c(1− λ{a,b})λ{a,c}λ{b,c}
p(1, 1, 1|acc) ∝ λ{a,b}λ{a,c}λ{b,c}
Here, bxc denotes the floor function that returns the maximum integer that
is equal to or less than x. Figure 3 shows the posterior distribution over
attack relations versus the number of observations. When the number of
observations increases, it is observed that the posterior probability of the
attack relation, (Att{a,b} = 1, Att{a,c} = 1, Att{b,c} = 1), converges to one.
The result is reasonable in terms of complete semantics because the attack
relation can successfully explain all of the observations.
4. Theoretical Evaluation of Model Correctness
4.1. Comprehensive Solutions to Inverse Problems
In this section, we investigate the relationship between modelM and the
inverse problem of the abstract argumentation. For the sake of simplicity, we
do not distinguish att ⊆ arg× arg and the sequence att of values of attack-
relation variables where (Att(a,b) = 1) ∈ att if (a, b) ∈ att and (Att(a,b) =
0) ∈ att if (a, b) /∈ att, for all arguments a, b ∈ arg. Similarly, we do not
distinguish acc ⊆ Pow(arg) and the sequence acc of values of acceptability
variables where (Accd = 1) ∈ acc if d ∈ acc and (Accd = 0) ∈ acc if d /∈ acc,
for all d ∈ Pow(arg).
An estimate with the maximum likelihood (so-called an ML estimation)
gives an attack relation that maximizes the likelihood of an observed accept-
ability. It has the form
aˆtt = arg max
att
p(acc|att).
The following theorem states that a solution to an inverse problem is an ML
estimation in M.
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Figure 3: The horizontal axis shows the twenty iterated observations of Acc{a} = 1,
Acc{b} = 1 and Acc{c} = 1 in this order. The vertical axis shows the posterior
probability of each attack relation (att{a,b}, att{a,c}, att{b,c}). We used the follow-
ing parameters: λ{a,b} = 0.1, λ{a,c} = 0.15, λ{b,c} = 0.2 and the exponential
acceptability parameters θd|att shown in Table 1 with w = 2.
Theorem 1. Let att ⊆ arg × arg and acc ⊆ Pow(arg). Given acc, if att
is a solution to the inverse problem then att is an ML estimation in M.
The converse of Theorem 1 does not hold in general.
Theorem 2. Let att ⊆ arg × arg and acc ⊆ Pow(arg). Given acc, if
att is an ML estimation in M then it is not necessarily true that att is a
solution to the inverse problem.
Theorems 1 and 2 state that if it is a solution to an inverse problem then
it is a solution to an ML estimation but not vice versa. This fact implies that
a solution to an ML estimation is weaker than that of an inverse problem.
However, the weakness does not mean worthless. In fact, the weakness of an
ML estimation enables to deal with the presence of noise and the multiplicity
of solutions we discussed with Equations (3) and (4), respectively.
Example 7. Given arg = {a, b}, let us suppose acc = {∅, {a, b}} and
attk = ∅. Given acc, there is no solution to the inverse problem. How-
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ever, (Att(a,b) = 1, Att(b,a) = 1) is the ML estimation because we have
p(Acc∅ = 1, Acc{a,b} = 1|Att(a,b) = 0, Att(b,a) = 0) ∝ θ∅|0,0θ{a,b}|0,0 = 0
p(Acc∅ = 1, Acc{a,b} = 1|Att(a,b) = 1, Att(b,a) = 0) ∝ θ∅|1,0θ{a,b}|1,0 = 1
9
p(Acc∅ = 1, Acc{a,b} = 1|Att(a,b) = 0, Att(b,a) = 1) ∝ θ∅|0,1θ{a,b}|0,1 = 1
9
p(Acc∅ = 1, Acc{a,b} = 1|Att(a,b) = 1, Att(b,a) = 1) ∝ θ∅|1,1θ{a,b}|1,1 = 1
3
.
Here, we have assumed attack parameters λ(a,b) = λ(b,a) = 1/2 and exponen-
tial acceptability parameter θd|att with w = 2 defined by complete semantics.
This example shows that the use of an ML estimation is more useful than
the deterministic solution because the deterministic solution can only tell us
the fact that there is no solution to the inverse problem.
We can benefit more from our probabilistic model M due to the the-
oretical fact that an ML estimation is an approximation of the Bayesian
inference of p(Att|acc). Since it is a probability distribution, it is written
as an N -tuple
p(Att|acc) = 〈p(att1|acc), p(att2|acc), · · · , p(attN |acc)〉,
where N is the number of possible different attack relations. Now, we assume
that the posterior distribution has a sharp peak at a unique attack relation
aˆtt, i.e., p(Att|acc) = 1 if Att = aˆtt and otherwise p(Att|acc) = 0. Then,
the Bayesian inference corresponds to solve the equation
aˆtt = arg max
att
p(att|acc) = arg max
att
p(acc|att)p(att).
In the last expression, we applied Bayes’ theorem and eliminated the denom-
inator irrelevant to the maximization. Interestingly, the equation represents
an estimate with a maximum a posteriori (so-called an MAP estimation).
Next, we assume that the prior distribution p(Att) over attack relations is
uniform, i.e., constant c. We then have
aˆtt = arg max
att
p(acc|att)c = arg max
att
p(acc|att).
Constant c is eliminated in the last expression because of its irrelevance to the
maximization. Interestingly, this equation is an ML estimation. In sum, we
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saw that an ML estimation is obtained by restricting the prior distribution of
an MAP estimation, and that an MAP estimation is obtained by restricting
the posterior distribution of a Bayesian inference.
The theoretical consequences discussed in this section are summarized as
follows. First, an ML estimation is more flexible than a solution to an inverse
problem. Second. an ML estimation is a special case of an MAP estimation.
Third, an MAP estimation is a special case of a Bayesian inference. The
practical implications of the consequences are summarized as follows.
• It is reasonable to use an ML estimation instead of a deterministic ap-
proach to solve an inverse problem because it gives a solution regardless
of the existence of a noise in an observation.
• It is reasonable to use an MAP estimation instead of an ML estimation
because it allows us to reflect a subjective belief on attack relations.
• It is reasonable to use a Bayesian inference instead of an MAP esti-
mation because it tells us the uncertainty to what extent each attack
relation is likely to be the case.
Figure 4 illustrates an advantage of the use of a Bayesian inference in
the inverse problem. It shows that attack relations are distributed prob-
abilistically and its probability distribution is updated in accordance with
an observed acceptability. A deterministic solution to the inverse problem
is obviously its special case where there is only one attack relation whose
posterior probability is one.
4.2. Comprehensive Solutions to Direct Problems
We next investigate the relationship between model M and the direct
problem of the abstract argumentation. A prediction with a maximum like-
lihood (so-called an ML prediction) gives an acceptability that is most likely
to be generated from a given attack relation. It has the form
ˆacc = arg max
acc
p(acc|att).
Thus, an acceptability, denoted by ˆacc, given by an ML prediction maximizes
its likelihood. The following relation exists between the direct problem and
an ML prediction in M.
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Figure 4: From the point of view of the inverse problem, the two graphs illustrate
that the observation of the acceptability of d, i.e., the grey node, updates the
posterior attack distribution, i.e., the upper curve. From the point of view of
the direct problem, the two graphs illustrate that the updated attack distribution
updates the posterior acceptability distribution of e, i.e., the lower curve.
Theorem 3. Let att ⊆ arg× arg and acc ⊆ Pow(arg). Given att, acc is
a solution to the direct problem if and only if acc is an ML prediction in M
with w ≥ 2.
Theorem 3 states that an ML prediction in modelM coincides with a solution
to the direct problem. In other words, a direct problem is just one problem
we can deal with using the abstract argumentation model.
This fact causes the question, what type of direct problems the abstract
argumentation model allows us to deal with in general. The answer is that
the abstract argumentation model may discuss a solution to a direct problem
depending on multiple attack relations (recall Equation (4)). This is because
attack relations are assumed to be probabilistically distributed in the ab-
stract argumentation model. As for the evidence or marginal likelihood, i.e.,
p(Acc), we have
p(Acc) =
∑
att1
∑
att2
· · ·
∑
attM
p(Acc, att1, att2, · · · , attM)
=
∑
att
p(Acc,att)
=
∑
att
p(Acc|att)p(att). (7)
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We now suppose that an attack relation is deterministic, and thus, there is an
attack relation aˆtt such that p(aˆtt) = 1 holds. It can be seen as a restriction
on the attack distribution p(Att). We then have
p(Acc) = p(Acc|aˆtt) = 〈p(acc1|aˆtt), p(acc2|aˆtt), · · · , p(accN |aˆtt)〉
where N is the number of the acceptability variables. It states that the
likelihood distribution, i.e., p(Acc|aˆtt), is a special form of the evidence under
the restriction. Now, we pay attention to the acceptability ˆacc maximizing
the likelihood. It can be seen as a restriction on the likelihood distribution.
It is represented by
ˆacc = arg max
acc
p(acc|aˆtt).
This is an ML prediction. It thus states that an ML prediction is a special
form of a prediction with a likelihood distribution under the restriction.
The theoretical consequences discussed in this section are summarized as
follows. An ML prediction is equivalent to a solution to a direct problem. An
ML prediction is a special case of a prediction with a likelihood distribution
p(Acc|att). A prediction with a likelihood distribution is a special case
of a prediction with an evidence p(Acc). The practical implications of the
consequences are summarized as follows.
• There is no positive reason to use an ML prediction instead of a deter-
ministic approach to solve a direct problem.
• It is reasonable to use a likelihood distribution instead of an ML predic-
tion because it tells us the uncertainty to what extent a set of arguments
is acceptable.
• It is reasonable to use an evidence instead of a likelihood distribution
because it gives a formal account of acceptability caused by multiple
attack relations distributed probabilistically.
Figure 4 illustrates an advantage of the use of Bayesian approach in the
direct problem. It shows that a prediction of acceptability is performed
by taking into account all attack relations distributed probabilistically. A
deterministic solution to the direct problem is obviously its special case where
there is only one attack relation whose posterior probability is one.
23
5. Empirical Evaluation of Model Correctness
5.1. Posterior Acceptability Distribution
Our basic observations are that an attack relation is not observable, and
that an acceptability of arguments is observable via a vote in various social
networking services. We thus investigate to what extent the posterior distri-
bution over attack relations given an acceptability of arguments successfully
predicts another acceptability of arguments.4 The acceptability of a set e
of arguments is predicted using its posterior predictive distribution given as
follows.
p(Acce|acc) =
∑
att1
∑
att2
...
∑
attM
p(Acce, att1, att2, ..., attM |acc)
=
∑
att
p(Acce,att|acc)
=
∑
att
p(Acce|att)p(att|acc)
=
∑
att
θAccee|att(1− θe|att)1−Accep(att|acc). (8)
In line 3, the left term is the acceptability likelihood given the attack relation
and the right term is the posterior probability of the attack relation. It
thus can be seen that the posterior probability functions as a weight to its
likelihood.
Figure 5 shows the Bayesian network used in the prediction. It is an
instance of the model shown in Figure 2. We assume θe|att to be the linear
acceptability parameter. Recall Definition 6. It has the form
θe|att = max
d∈ε(arg,att)
{ |tp(e, d)|+ |tn(e, d)|
|arg|
}
.
We use the linear acceptability parameter because it represents an accuracy,
a machine learning criterion often used to evaluate predictive performance.
4One might think that a solution to the inverse problem should be evaluated based
on the fact that the solution conforms to a human judgement. As we briefly discussed
in Section 1, however, it is not a fundamental requirement of the inverse problem. The
inverse problem basically asks for an attack relation explaining an acceptability well in
terms of acceptability semantics.
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Figure 5: Abstract argumentation model used when predicting an unknown ac-
ceptability. In practice, it first traces the causality back to the attack relation from
the observed acceptability, i.e., Attm from Accd. It then follows the causality to
derive the distribution over unobserved acceptability, i.e., Acce.
Indeed, the inside of the bracket represents an accuracy of d with respect to
e. Since d is an extension caused by att, it is reasonable to think that the
above equation represents an accuracy of att with respect to e. Now, the
posterior predictive distribution over the acceptability of e is given by
p(Acce = 1|acc) =
∑
att
max
d∈ε(arg,att)
{ |tp(e, d)|+ |tn(e, d)|
|arg|
}
p(att|acc)
p(Acce = 0|acc) = 1− p(Acce = 1|acc).
Therefore, the whole accuracy is the weighted sum of the accuracies of all pos-
sible attack relations with respect to e. Intuitively speaking, each accuracy
has an influence on the whole accuracy as much as the posterior probability
of the attack relation. It is a natural extension of the accuracy criterion when
attack relations are distributed probabilistically.
5.2. Approximate Inference of Attack Relations
It is practically difficult to solve Equation (8) exactly due to computa-
tional complexity. We thus solve
p(Acce|acc) '
∑
att
p(Acce|att)pˆ(att|acc)
=
∑
att
θAccee|att(1− θe|att)1−Acce pˆ(att|acc), (9)
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where pˆ(att|acc) represents an approximation of the true posterior
p(att|acc) and ' denotes an approximation of the equal sign. We obtain
the approximate distribution using Gibbs sampling [45] that is a simple and
widely applicable Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. A Gibbs sampling
repeatedly updates a value of each random variable one by one using its
posterior distribution given values of all remaining random variables. For
example, in the (i + 1)-th iteration of a Gibbs sampling, it samples a value
of each attack relation variable as follows.
atti+11 ∼ p(Att1|atti2, atti3, · · · , attiM ,acc)
atti+12 ∼ p(Att2|atti+11 , atti3, · · · , attiM ,acc)
...
atti+1M ∼ p(AttM |atti+11 , atti+12 , · · · , atti+1M−1,acc)
Here, ∼ denotes that the left value is sampled from the right distribution.
Let att
(i+1)
\m denote all values except attm sampled in the (i+ 1)-th iteration,
i.e., att
(i+1)
\m = (att
i+1
1 , att
i+1
2 , · · · , atti+1m−1, attim+1, · · · , attiM). In general, the
expression used in an attack relation sampling is given by
p(Attm|att(i+1)\m ,acc)
=
p(acc|Attm,att(i+1)\m )p(Attm)p(att(i+1)\m )
p(att
(i+1)
\m ,acc)
∝ p(acc|Attm,att(i+1)\m )p(Attm)
= λAttmm (1− λ)1−Attm
D∏
d
θaccd
d|Attm,att(i+1)\m
(1− θ
d|Attm,att(i+1)\m
)1−accd .
Here, Bayes’ theorem was used in line 2, the denominator irrelevant to Attm
was eliminated in line 3, and the parameters of the Bernoulli distributions
were introduced in line 4.
The Gibbs sampling algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. Lines 3-10 show a
generation process of a specific value of every attack relation. This process is
iterated I times so that it yields a distribution of histogram, denoted by freq ,
approximating the true posterior. The algorithm returns the approximate
distribution obtained by normalizing the histogram.
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Algorithm 1 Gibbs sampling for the abstract argumentation model
Require: Observation acc, semantics ε, constant w of the exponential accept-
ability parameters, constant λm of the attack parameters, iteration number I
and burn-in period B
Ensure: An approximation of the true posterior distribution over attack relations
1: Get att(0) by randomly assigning 0 or 1 to all elements of Att
2: for i = 0 to I do
3: for all Attm ∈ Att do
4: prob ← [1− λm, λm] . Compute p(att(i+1)m )
5: for all accd ∈ acc do . Compute p(accd|att(i+1)m ,att(i+1)\m )
6: prob[0]← prob[0] · θaccd
d|Attm=0,att(i+1)\m
(1− θ
d|Attm=0,att(i+1)\m
)1−accd
7: prob[1]← prob[1] · θaccd
d|Attm=1,att(i+1)\m
(1− θ
d|Attm=1,att(i+1)\m
)1−accd
8: end for
9: att
(i+1)
m ∼ prob . Generate att(i+1)m from p(Attm|att(i+1)\m ,acc)
10: end for
11: end for
12: freq ← ∅
13: for all att ∈ {att(i)|B < i ≤ I} do . Compute an attack relation histogram
14: count← the number of occurrence of att in (att(i)|B < i ≤ I)
15: freq ← freq ∪{(count,att)}
16: end for
17: return (count/(I −B)|(count,att) ∈ freq)
5.3. Learning Performance Evaluation
Figure 6 shows our dataset consisting of twenty-nine participants’ sen-
timents regarding acceptability of individual ten arguments manually ex-
tracted from an online forum. Their textual contents are found in Appendix.
Each anonymous participant is presented all of the arguments before she
expresses her sentiments. We use the following parameters required in Algo-
rithm 1: ε as complete semantics, w = 100, λ{a,b} = 0.5, for all arguments a
and b, I = 100 and B = 0.
A predictive accuracy is evaluated using a cross validation. It divides the
dataset into training and test sets disjoint each other. Training set acc is used
to calculate the approximate posterior attack distribution, i.e., pˆ(Att|acc)
shown in (9). Each test set Acce is used to calculate the posterior accept-
ability distribution, i.e., p(Acce|Att) shown in (9).
Figure 7 shows a learning curve of the dataset obtained with the cross
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Figure 6: Twenty-nine anonymous participants’ sentiments on ten individual argu-
ments. Each green and red cell denotes that the participant agrees and disagrees
the argument, respectively.
validation. The result shows that the accuracy of the prediction is around
80% at best, on average. It also shows that modelM predicts the acceptabil-
ity of test data better when it observes more training data. It implies that
participants’ sentiments on the acceptability of arguments can be explained
fairly using the acceptability semantics.
Figure 8 shows the convergence of attack relations sampled during the
Gibbs sampling. It is observed that sampled attack relations diverge com-
pletely when no training data is given. However, they converge when enough
training data is provided. It implies that the training data contributes to
find an attack relation explaining the data well.
Figure 9 shows all attack relations sampled while one hundred iterations
of the Gibbs sampling. Here, we have used all dataset shown in Figure 6 as a
training set. The textual contents of each argument are shown in Appendix.
6. Conclusions and Discussion
In this paper, we have studied an abstract but general probabilistic model
of the theory of abstract argumentation [17]. It captures the central notion
of acceptability of arguments in a probabilistic way. It allows us to deal
with both direct and inverse abstract argumentation problems where attack
relations are probabilistically distributed. We showed that a solution to both
direct and inverse problems was just a special case of probabilistic inference
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Figure 7: The horizontal axis shows the number of training data used to calculate
the posterior attack distribution. The vertical axis shows the posterior acceptabil-
ity probability, i.e., the predictive accuracy, of test data. For each training set size
specified in the horizontal axis, we randomly generated ten divisions of training
and test data. The curve is the average of the ten predictive accuracies. Each
error bar shows the standard deviation.
on the probabilistic model. We empirically demonstrated that our Bayesian
solution to an inverse problem was qualified in the sense that it fairly predicts
human sentiments regarding acceptability of arguments.
From the perspective of data-driven prediction of an attack relation, one
might think that acceptability semantics should not be specified in advance
but estimated from data. Such problem is often classified into a model iden-
tification problem [42] in contrast to an inverse and direct problem. In the
context of the abstract argumentation, it aims to determine acceptability
semantics given attack relations and argument acceptability. Although we
can think of a problem simultaneously discussing both inverse problem and
model identification problem, an outcome we can get via the discussion is
not very practical in terms of computational complexity and thus applicabil-
ity. It moreover contradicts the goal of this paper providing an abstract but
general probabilistic model dealing with a direct and inverse problem.
Our simple probabilistic model has important contributions. The past
two decades in the field of computational argumentation in AI witnessed an
intensive study of acceptability semantics and dialectical proof theories for
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Figure 8: The convergence of the posterior distribution over attack relations. Each
series shows the size of training data. The horizontal axis shows the number of
iterations in Gibbs sampling and the vertical axis shows the number of occurrences
of new attack relations during the sampling.
various interpretations and derivations of a consequence associated with a
given argumentation framework, a knowledge representation for argumenta-
tive knowledge, e.g., [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41]. This paper places
them on a direct problem and raises a new research direction, an inverse
problem. An inverse problem cannot be solved without the mathematics of
a direct problem. This paper thus finds another value of their studies and
functions as a guideline on how to make use of their formalisms to deal with
their inverse problems. Moreover, this paper lays the foundation for making
acceptability semantics data-driven. A data-driven approach is a minimal
requirement at the current era of data science. Data science expects AI to
gain insight into data available on the web or via sensors in the real world.
From data science point of view, a weakness of the study of the abstract
argumentation, and a symbolic AI in general, is a knowledge acquisition bot-
tleneck that is a problem on how to acquire knowledge from data. This is
because, in general, a knowledge representation is not what one has, but it
is what one wants and can have as a result of problem analysis. An input of
an inverse problem is a sentiment regarding acceptability of arguments. In
contrast to a direct problem, it is an unstructured data and thus available on
30
Figure 9: Attack relations sampled versus the number of their occurrences.
the web, e.g., votes in various social networking services. It makes us easier
to find a killer AI application of acceptability semantics.
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Appendix
Proofs of Theorems
Proof (Proposition 1). This directly follows from the fact that, for any
two abstract argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 with the same set
of arguments, and symmetric and irreflexive attack relations, if ε(AF1) =
ε(AF2) then AF1 = AF2 for any semantics except grounded semantics. As
for grounded semantics, it is obvious because the empty set is the grounded
extension of any AFi (i = 1, 2) with a symmetric non-empty attack relation.
For the remaining semantics, since AFi is symmetric and irreflexive, it can
be regarded as an undirected graph without self-loop where a node and an
edge represent an argument and an attack between arguments, respectively.
For all independent sets S of this graph, S is an admissible set of AFi. There
is thus a set T ⊇ S such that T is a preferred extension AFi. Since AFi
is symmetric, a set of arguments is a preferred extension if and only if it
is a stable extension. It is moreover obvious that a preferred extension is a
complete extension. If AF1 6= AF2 then the set of independent sets of AF1
does not coincide with that of AF2. Therefore, the set of preferred extensions
of AF1 does not coincide with that of AF2.
Proof (Proposition 2). Let f be the normalized exponential function,
i.e., Equation (5). We then have
lim
w→∞
f(x) = lim
w→∞
wx−|arg| − 1
w|arg|
1− 1
w|arg|
= lim
w→∞
wx−|arg| =
{
1 x = |arg|
0 otherwise.
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Proof (Proposition 3). Let f be the normalized exponential function,
i.e., Equation (5). Using l’H˚opital’s rule, we have
lim
w→∞
f(x) = lim
w→1
wx − 1
w|arg| − 1 = limw→1
xwx−1
|arg|w|arg|−1 =
x
|arg| .
Proof (Theorem 1). Let attk be an arbitrary attack relation. acc can be
divided into four disjoint sets.
acctp = {(Accd = 1) ∈ acc|d ∈ ε(arg, attk, att)}
accfn = {(Accd = 1) ∈ acc|d /∈ ε(arg, attk, att)}
accfp = {(Accd = 0) ∈ acc|d ∈ ε(arg, attk, att)}
acctn = {(Accd = 0) ∈ acc|d /∈ ε(arg, attk, att)}
Since acceptability is independent and identically distributed, we have
p(acc|attk,att)
= p(acctp|attk,att)p(accfn|attk,att)p(accfp|attk,att)p(acctn|attk,att)
=
|acctp|∏
d1
θd1|attk,att
|accfn|∏
d2
θd2|attk,att
|accfp|∏
d3
(1− θd3|attk,att)
|acctn|∏
d4
(1− θd4|attk,att).
Since att is a solution to the inverse problem, i.e., acc = ε(arg, attk, att),
acctp ∪ acctn = acc and accfp ∪ accfn = ∅ holds. We thus have
p(acc|attk,att) =
|acctp|∏
d1
θd1|attk,att
|acctn|∏
d4
(1− θd4|attk,att).
Now, any attack relation that is not a solution to the inverse problem
causes a shift of an element from acctp to accfn or acctn to accfp. How-
ever, this never makes the probability higher. This is because θd1|attk,att >
θd2|attk,att and (1−θd4|attk,att) > (1−θd3|attk,att) hold from Definition 7 where
θd1|attk,att = 1, θd2|attk,att < 1, θd3|attk,att = 1 and θd4|attk,att < 1 hold.
Proof (Theorem 2). It is enough to show a counterexample. Given
acc = {∅, {a, b}} and attk = ∅, there is an ML estimation att(a,b) because
p(acc|attk, att(a,b)) ≥ 0 holds for any att(a,b). However, it is never a solution
to the inverse problem because there is no attack relation of which acc is the
set of extensions.
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Proof (Theorem 3). (⇒) acc can be divided into four disjoint sets.
acctp = {(Accd = 1) ∈ acc|d ∈ ε(arg, att)}
accfn = {(Accd = 1) ∈ acc|d /∈ ε(arg, att)}
accfp = {(Accd = 0) ∈ acc|d ∈ ε(arg, att)}
acctn = {(Accd = 0) ∈ acc|d /∈ ε(arg, att)}
Since acceptability is independent and identically distributed, we have
p(acc|att) = p(acctp|att)p(accfn|att)p(accfp|att)p(acctn|att)
=
|acctp|∏
d1
θd1|att
|accfn|∏
d2
θd2|att
|accfp|∏
d3
(1− θd3|att)
|acctn|∏
d4
(1− θd4|att).
Since att is a solution to the direct problem, acc = ε(arg, att) holds. Thus,
acctp ∪ acctn = acc and accfp ∪ accfn = ∅ holds. We thus have
p(acc|att) =
|acctp|∏
d1
θd1|att
|acctn|∏
d4
(1− θd4|att) (10)
Now, any acceptability that is not a solution to the direct problem causes
a shift of an element from acctp to accfp or acctn to accfn. However,
this never makes the probability higher because θd1|att > (1 − θd3|att) and
(1− θd4|att) > θd2|att hold. This is because, from Definition 7, if w ≥ 2 holds
then θd1|att = 1, θd2|att < 0.5, θd3|att = 1 and θd4|att < 0.5 hold. Here, we
prove θd|att < 0.5 holds if d /∈ ε(arg,att) and w ≥ 2, as follows. Let d be
a set of arguments such that there is, at best, an extension e ∈ ε(arg, att)
satisfying |tp(d, e)| + |tn(d, e)| = |arg| − 1. Here, we do not need to think
of |tp(d, e)|+ |tn(d, e)| < |arg| − 1 because of the monotonicity of θd|att. We
then have
θd|att =
w|arg|−1 − 1
w|arg| − 1 =
1
w
w|arg| − w
w|arg| − 1
2θd|att =
2
w
w|arg| − w
w|arg| − 1 .
Now, 2θd|att < 1 holds, for all w ≥ 2. Indeed, if w = 2 then 2/w = 1 and
(w|arg| − w)/(w|arg| − 1) < 1 hold. If w > 2 then 2/w < 1 and (w|arg| −
w)/(w|arg| − 1) < 1 hold as well.
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(⇐) We show that if acc is not a solution to the direct problem then
it does not maximize the likelihood of acc. We do not need to consider
the case where there is no solution to a direct problem because it does not
satisfy the antecedent. If acc is not a solution then acctp ∪ acctn ⊂ acc
and accfn ∪ accfp ⊃ ∅ hold. However, since a direct problem satisfies the
solution uniqueness, there is a unique acc′ such that acc′tp ∪ acc′tn = acc′
and acc′fn∪acc′fp = ∅. Since θd1|att > (1−θd3|att) and (1−θd4|att) > θd2|att
hold in Equation (10), p(acc′|att) > p(acc|att) holds.
Dataset of Arguments
The ten arguments used in our empirical analysis have the following tex-
tual contents. They were presented in this order in SYNCLON [46]. We
manually extracted them and translated them into English.
a: Euthanasia (painless death) should be allowed by law because a medical
treatment by doctors should respect patient’s will.
b: Euthanasia should not be allowed by law. You assume that one who applies
euthanasia is a doctor. I doubt doctor’s right to commit a murder.
c: I agree with you that euthanasia should be allowed by law, but disagree
with the point that one who applies is a doctor. A doctor should always
consider the way to cure diseases.
d: If doctor’s role is only to cure a disease then they can do nothing for
patients with an untreatable disease. I think that a medical treatment
should consider death more seriously. Only doctors can apply euthana-
sia appropriately because they can assess patients’ physical and mental
state accurately.
e: But, it will be scary if there are professionals for euthanasia.
f: I mean that I disagree with the point that a doctor encourages a patient
to choose euthanasia. A doctor can help a patient with an untreatable
disease without encouraging her to choose euthanasia. A doctor and a
patient can lay heads together to think about how she can live with a
disease. This is how a doctor can consider patient’s death.
g: Of course, no one has a right to encourage a patient to choose euthanasia.
Euthanasia can be applied on the basis of patient’s and her family’s
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agreement. I think it is possible that a doctor applies euthanasia when
their will for euthanasia is confirmed.
h: I think that an agreement or confirmation does not show patient’s true will
because I occasionally wish for death when I have hard an experience.
But, it sometimes comes from a temporary emotion. I certainly know
that my experience is a little thing compared to patient’s sufferance.
But, I think it is insufficient to apply euthanasia based on patient’s will
for death.
i: Can you accept legal euthanasia if it is based not only on patient’s will,
but also her family’s will?
j: I cannot accept legal euthanasia even though it is based not only on pa-
tient’s will, but also her family’s will. At the moment, I cannot agree
euthanasia without considering patient’s physical condition. So, I agree
with passive euthanasia.
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